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Abstract
Though it seems as if personal bankruptcy regulation was a new legislative solution of the last 
decades, handling personal bankruptcies has a long history and broad legislative background. 
The  need  for  implementing  a  modern  regulatory  framework  for  handling  personal 
bankruptcies  goes  back to  the  second part  of  the  20th century,  when personal,  consumer 
lending  reached  a  massive  volume,  and  non-performing  defaulted  portfolios  resulted  in 
serious  macroeconomic,  social,  and  political  impact.  Many  countries  have  introduced 
measures  to  handle  defaulted  personal  loans,  and  personal  bankruptcy  regulations  were 
launched in most European countries during the last 30 years. Though structures are different, 
the general elements of such systems could be outlined. One of the most disputed principles 
of the systems is the handling of “fresh start” and the implicated degree of the “leniency” of 
the  systems.  In this  working paper,  I  present  the  brief  history,  the structural  elements  of 
personal bankruptcy regulations, and the building blocks of the fresh start. I also discuss three 
different legislative solutions: the US, the Austrian, and the Hungarian model. I conclude that 
there are continuous changes in the systems regarding the handling of fresh start. While the 
US legislation moves to the less lenient direction, there are measures from European countries 
to change the laws to more debtor-friendly systems. The Hungarian version was created to 
follow the strict, less lenient structures in a time when some countries in the region moved 
towards more lenient systems. 
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History of personal bankruptcy
Going back to the history of personal bankruptcy, individuals who filed for bankruptcy were 
handled extremely harshly. The default was considered as a criminal offense, and –depending 
on the society, country, religion, and historical era – seduced different arts of punishment like 
forfeiture of all property, revocation of citizenship, forcing to sit in public and place baskets, 
wear distinguishing clothes in public, selling defaulters into slavery, forcing them into exile, a 
prohibition from holding public office, imprisonment, and even death penalty (Efrat, 2006)
Paying back debt obligation was many times regarded as a strict moral or religious obligation. 
Failing this obligation resulted in a bankruptcy stigma, which is a crucial element in initiating 
and handling bankruptcies since ancient societies until modern economies of today. However, 
religion and moral standards were not always enough to rule everyday life. Formal rules and 
regulations  were also required  to  handle insolvency and bankruptcy  issues.  As the  brutal 
attitude of handling bankruptcy had not changed until the 19th-20th century, the bankruptcy 
laws were also typically very harsh. Legislators usually gave very strong incentives to fulfill 
debt obligations. Examples could be mentioned from ancient times, from early Roman law, 
Babylonian  or  Mesopotamian  times,  traditional  Chinese,  or  Jewish  societies.  These 
regulations  and  practices  were  examples  of  the  so-called  “debt  bondage”,  involuntary 
servitude of the debtor. (Robe-Steiger, 2015) Specific law gave creditors the additional right 
to sell defaulted debtors assets in Venice in the 12th century, which was a new element besides 
debt bondage. However, the regulation and its main attitude of handling bankrupted persons 
have merely changed in the Middle age, although a new institution was introduced: instead of 
using debt  bondage,  debtors’  prison became widespread,  serving as  an incentive  to  force 
payments.
The negative and harsh treatment of bankruptcy was maintained in colonial America and the 
Victorian era. (Efrat, 2006) The first US bankruptcy law was introduced in 1800 based on 
English  law.  It  was  adapted  to  handle  commercial  loan  files,  in  favor  of  the  creditors. 
However, since the very end of the 19th century (since 1898) even non-commercial debtors 
have been able to file for personal bankruptcy proceedings in the US, where a debt release 
was also a possible outcome. (Robe-Steiger, 2015) Important to mention, that the legislation 
had always difficulties in making formal differences between the case of commercial loan and 
a personal loan. Until the second part of the 20th century, there was no legislative distinction 
between a commercial or personal bankruptcy. The default of a commercial loan was handled 
less  rigorously  as  it  was  regarded  as  a  riskier  deal  and  contract.  Ancient  and  medieval 
bankruptcy laws applied only to commercial loans in almost all cases.
In  legislation,  it  was  also  a  permanent  question  of  how  to  make  a  difference  between 
responsible  (getting  into  trouble  due  to  external  factors  and  were  unlucky)  and  culpable 
borrowers (who were irresponsible, greedy, malicious). These struggles and disputes are still 
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present  in  the  debates  of  different  legislative  solutions  for  treating  personal  bankruptcies, 
defaults, and fresh start. The historical change of how the society and legislators regarded the 
issue of personal responsibility of the debtor has significantly affected the development of 
personal bankruptcy legislations. (Robe -Steiger 2015)
By the 1960s the number of consumer loans, debtors, and defaults had risen dramatically, 
which changed the attitude in the economy and society towards filing for bankruptcy and the 
defaulted debtors. Besides critics about the declining moral and economic pressure to handle 
the increasing number of cases had also become evident. (Efrat, 2006)
Legal regulation, grouping alternatives
Before1979 the bankruptcy legal regulation in the US was based on the law of 1898. Since 
1979 several changes have been implemented in the legislation and the actual law currently 
referred to as “Bankruptcy Code”. The last significant and notable change was made in 2005 
with  the  implementation  of  the  so-called  BAPCPA –  Bankruptcy  Abuse  Prevention  and 
Consumer Protection Act. (Wagner, 2006)
From the 1980s personal bankruptcy regulations and loans were implemented one after the 
other  in  the  Western  European  countries:  Denmark  (1984),  Great  Britain  (1986),  France 
(1989),  Sweden  (1994),  Germany  (1994),  Austria  (1995),  Finland  and  Norway  (1994), 
Belgium and the Netherland (1998-1999), Ireland (2013). From 2000 further countries have 
introduced personal bankruptcy legislations in Central Eastern Europe too: Slovakia (2006), 
Czech  Republic  (2008),  Poland  (2009),  Hungary  (2015),  Romania  (2018).  Furthermore, 
personal  bankruptcy  regulation  also  exists  in  Italy,  Portugal,  Slovenia,  Greece.  Baltic 
countries have implemented the regulatory framework during the last 10-15 years. (Báger, 
2015; Győri, 2009; Wagner, 2006)
From a legal point of view, there were two solutions in European countries. It was either the 
general bankruptcy (or customer protection) regulation that was extended to handle personal 
bankruptcy  (like  in  Germany  or  Austria)  or  a  new  law  was  implemented  and  accepted 
specifically to handle personal bankruptcy (like in Ireland or Hungary) (OH, 2016). There is 
an EU (EU 2015/848) regulation on insolvency procedures to avoid the so-called  "forum 
shopping”, the arbitraging opportunities among different county regulations. 
In current terminology “personal bankruptcy law is the legal process for resolving the debts 
of  insolvent  individuals,  married  couples,  … entrepreneurs,  and  small  business  owners”, 
usually referred to as filers. (White, 2015 pp.3)
The  key  points,  characters  in  grouping  and  characterizing  the  different  bankruptcy  laws, 
models and legislation of countries are as follows1:
1 IM (2005)
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1. Based on the start of the procedure, eligibility criteria:
 who  is  entitled  to  participate,  to  file  for  in  the  process  (natural  person,  private 
entrepreneurs, special conditions, limitation due to former procedures);
 who is entitled to initiate procedure (creditor, debtor, or legislation);
 what the preconditions are (barriers in wealth, income, collaterals, status to start the 
process);
 what the preconditions of the debt are (types of debt, volume);
 validity for non-consumer type obligations (alimony, penalties);
 whether it can be started in case of overdue obligations or for imminent insolvency;
 how expensive the procedure is, and who bears the cost (fees, other costs).
2. Based on events and activities during the process
 who conducts the process (bankruptcy offices or committees, court, municipality);
 are all creditors included;
 the way of reaching bankruptcy agreement (majority decision of debtors, composition 
proceedings);
 the properties included in the repayment (total of properties available, or properties 
under-enforcement, future properties);
 the exemptions during the process (properties or future incomes that a debtor could 
prevent creditors from recovering);
 the length of the process (length of moratorium, agreed repayment obligations);
 the existence of other provisions against the debtor to force fulfill repayment schedule 
(ban to take up loans, control all incomes and expenses, investments).
3. Based on the end, the outcome of the procedure:
 the length of the necessary repayment obligation period;
 the level of necessary repayment benchmark for closing (as a percentage of debt);
 the level of debt relief due to the participation (only moratorium or partial possibly full 
discharge2);
 further possible administrative steps and measures (stigmas:  limitation in taking up 
loans, appearance in lists, registrations, announcements).
There  is  also  a  grouping  opportunity  and  philosophical  difference  based  on  the  general 
approach of the law and procedure. Whose interests, the debtors or the creditors are more 
defended  and  represented  in  the  process?  In  the  US  legislation,  the  debtors’  rights  and 
interests  are/were  more  preferred  than  in  continental  European  countries,  where  creditor 
friendly  personal  bankruptcy  legislations  were  traditionally  preferred.  These  different 
approaches lead to different related research fields, which are permanently discussed in the 
literature: 
 moral hazard and the question of discharge and relief of debt, the question of “fresh 
start” and its potential abuse; 
2 A release of a debtor from personal liability for a certain debt. (US Bankruptcy Code)
4
 bankruptcy as a type of social insurance; the role, and the relation of welfare states to 
personal bankruptcy; 
 the relation of bankruptcy regulation and the incentives for entrepreneurship, effect on 
labor supply; 
 the stigmatization of the participants.
These topics are closely related and overlapping each other, the certain attitudes and answers 
greatly influence the practical foundation and implementation of the given model.
The “fresh start”
A central element of personal bankruptcy is the opportunity of a fresh start. The “fresh start” 
is thoroughly examined in the literature as a key factor leading to analyze the possible abuses, 
the direct  connection to  the social  insurance,  the necessity and role of stigmatization  and 
punishment,  and  its  relation  to  the  incentives  on  entrepreneurship,  labor  market.  The 
appearance  of  the  fresh  start  is  closely  related  to  the  level  of  the  leniency  of  the  given 
bankruptcy systems handling the defaults of private persons and entrepreneurs with unlimited 
liabilities.
A  fresh  start  is  an  aggregative  term  that  incorporates  the  following  main  blocks  of  the 
personal bankruptcy legislations:
1. The  availability,  the  existence  of  straight  bankruptcy (like  Chapter  7  in  the  US 
regulation)
2. Eligibility criteria:
 Who is entitled to participate,  to file for in the process (natural person, private 
entrepreneurs, special conditions, limitation due to former procedures)?
 Who is entitled to initiate a procedure (creditor, debtor, or legislation)?
 What are the preconditions, barriers in wealth, income, collaterals, status to start?
 What are the preconditions in debt (the art of debt, volume)?
 Is it valid for non-consumer type obligations (alimony, penalties)?
 Could it be started in case of overdue obligations or for imminent insolvency?
3. Expensiveness (transaction costs) of the procedure from debtor side
4. The complexity of the process:
 Who conducts the process (bankruptcy offices or committees, court, municipality)?
 How many types of creditors are included?
 How is the way of reaching bankruptcy agreement (majority decision of debtors, 
composition proceedings)?
 What is the usual length of the process (length of moratorium, agreed repayment 
obligations)?
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5. Exemptions  (based  on threshold,  property  and  income  types,  future 
incomes/properties)
6. Conditions for discharge at debt restructuring:
 length of necessary repayment obligation, the settlement period;
 level of necessary repayment benchmark for closing (as a percentage of debt);
 level of debt relief due to the participation (only moratorium or partial possibly full 
discharge;
 automatic discharge or conditional of a court decision.
7. Stigmas of filing and after filing:
 existence of other provisions against the debtor to force fulfill repayment schedule 
(ban to take up loans, controlling all incomes and expenses, investments);
 stigmatic name in legislation (bankruptcy, debt settlement);
 further possible punishing administrative steps and measures (limitation in taking 
up loans, appearance in lists, registrations, announcements).
The list above partly corresponds to the main categories defined also by White (2007) who 
analyzed the systems of some selected countries (US, France, Germany, England, Canada). 
He compared the bankruptcy policies based on the trade-off between providing insurance to 
debtors  versus  punishing default.  The  seven categories  for  the  selection  he used were  as 
follows: the amount of debt discharged, the asset exemptions,  the income exemptions,  the 
fraction of income above the exemption that debtors must use to repay, the length of the 
repayment obligations, bankruptcy costs, and the bankruptcy punishments. 
The parameters based on the above-detailed categories show a large variety in the world but 
even among the European countries’ legislative solutions. Efrat (2002) groups the countries in 
the world based on the “availability, certainty, and promptness of debt forgiveness”. The first 
group  is  named  “conservatives” where  no  discharge,  no  fresh  start  is  available.  Non-
commercial personal defaulters are not allowed to file, or if allowed, no discharge is possible.  
In the second “moderate group” there is a chance for discharge and a fresh start, but whether 
it could be received, it is uncertain. Eligibility is strict, the process is not well-known, it could 
be expensive, and/or the fear of abuse is high. By the third group of “liberals”, outcomes 
could lead quickly and automatically  to a fresh start  either  via the straight  bankruptcy or 
through repayment settlements.
The existence,  the  degree,  the  possible  effects  of  a  fresh start  is  heavily  disputed  in  the 
theoretical and empirical literature of personal bankruptcy. One of the central points of the 
disputes is the hypothesis that fresh start reduces the individual risk to start an entrepreneurial 
activity (an investment) as it offers a “social insurance” to debtors. Though it encourages 
entrepreneurial activity, it also increases moral hazard. Therefore, as risk shifts to creditors, 
the lenders may charge higher interest rates or ration credit supply (“credit rational”) as they 
are afraid of recovering less of their credit,  they face higher credit risk.  The theory states 
(Alexandrov–Jimenez, 2017) that if consumer protection is reduced, there are three effects on 
debtors. Firstly, debtors lose some of their existing protections (influencing entrepreneurship 
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development).  Secondly,  there  is  an  indirect  effect  of  individuals  receiving  lower  prices, 
which is embodied in lower the interest  rates; thirdly,  there is a demand-expansion effect 
leading a new debtor to enter the market (credit rational).  
The clear objective of the fresh start in the bankruptcy systems is to encourage employees’ 
work incentives, which intention was also confirmed by the statement of the U.S. Supreme 
Court at the creation of the legislation. (Chen–Zao, 2017, pp 40) Despite its importance, it is 
surprising, that – relative to the large number of studies examining the relation of fresh start, 
leniency,  entrepreneurship,  and credit  rational  – only a few papers analyze the relation of 
fresh start, credit rational, and labor supply. By focusing on labor incentives, there are also 
two inverse effects detected called “wealth effects” and “borrowing constraint effects”.  The 
wealth effect leads to reduce work efforts as debtors no longer need to work to pay back their 
debt and potential employees can be more selective in their job search. On the other hand, due 
to the borrowing constraint effect, defaulted individuals have limited access to borrowing due 
to their track record, and as they must work more to insure themselves against unexpected 
expenses. (Chen–Zao, 2017) 
Finally,  Jia (2015) states that the welfare impact  on workers and entrepreneurs  is diverse 
especially in Europe. It concludes that the treatment of bankruptcy due to default in business 
or consumption of workers should also be different. Given the large differences between the 
welfare impact  on workers and entrepreneurs,  policymakers of Europe should think about 
treating  personal  bankruptcies  resulting  from  business  failures  and  personal  failures 
separately. 
Two basic model types: the US and Austrian systems
The US model
The US model is one of the oldest systems among the modern personal bankruptcy legislative 
systems and regarded  as  one  of  the  most  lenient  ones.  Most  of  the  literature  relates  the 
analysis  of  this  system,  concerning the  necessary level  of  leniency,  abuses,  the  effect  on 
entrepreneurship, and the overall effect of fresh start.
In the US, the bankruptcy files currently proceed under the rules of the US Bankruptcy Code 
in federal courts. As usual in common law countries, besides the bankruptcy procedure for 
individuals,  the  legislation  of  corporate  bankruptcy  had  been  built  as  two  different 
constructions incorporated by two different laws: the Bankruptcy Law and the Companies 
Act.  Later,  legislation  unified  the  legislation  into  one  Codex,  however  in  two  different 
chapters. (Wagner, 2006) (US Courts)
Based on the Bankruptcy Code there are two types of bankruptcy procedures (two chapters) 
an individual debtor can file. One is referred to as Chapter 7 the other is as Chapter 13. The 
7
conditions of choosing between the two chapters changed notably in 2005 when the so-called 
BAPCPA3 came into force, which made filing for Chapter 7 more difficult. 
In general, if a defaulted person file for Chapter 7, the debtor, more precisely, an appointed 
trustee liquidates a portfolio of assets to pay back its obligation fully or partially. The assets 
under potential liquidation are defined by an exempt–non-exempt rule that varies across the 
states’  regulations.  If  a  liquidation  of  such liquid  assets  takes  place,  then  the  debtor  will 
receive  a  discharge  of  most  of  the  unsecured  debt.  Unsecured  debts  are  credit  card 
obligations, personal loans, medical bills, utility bills. The debtor is not allowed to file for 
Chapter 7 again during the next six years after the last filing. (US Courts) This model is like 
liquidation models of commercial loans for corporations adapted in most countries, also often 
referred to and named straight bankruptcy. 
According to Chapter 13 (Individual Debt Adjustment), debtor's assets remain unaffected, 
instead, debtors repay all or part of their debt based on their future income based on a so-
called repayment plan. The repayment plan lasts over three to five years. After accomplishing 
the repayment plan, all remaining debts are discharged. A debtor is not allowed to file again 
under Chapter 13 for 180 days following the last filing. (Eraslan et al., 2014; US Courts)
Before the new law of 2005 debtors had the right to choose between the two chapters. There 
were many debates also in the financial literature before 2005 whether the lenient system had 
resulted in more economic welfare or had done harm due to increased moral hazard and credit 
rational.  The stricter BAPCPA law imposed many changes, which have been also heavily 
disputed since 2005 now concerning the effect of moving to a less lenient system. The new 
law made fresh start more difficult from almost all aspects. It limited the choice between the 
chapters,  made  the  bankruptcy  process  less  debtor-friendly  and  the  repayment  longer. 
(Alexandrov–Jimenez, 2014) It introduced higher filing fees and a new test on debtors. The 
main objective of these changes was to reduce consumer protection, re-route debtors from 
Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, and to ensure that debtors with sufficient income would pay based on 
a repayment plan under Chapter 13. Chapter 7 has become an option only if the debtor has 
insufficient income, mainly compared to the state median income level. To decide whether the 
filing is “presumptively abusive” a so-called “mean test” is required, where an aggregated 
monthly income over 5 years is examined. The court may also dismiss a file for Chapter 7 – 
explained as an abuse – if an individual’s debts are primarily consumer rather than business 
debts. In the case of filing for Chapter 13, the length of the repayment is also determined by 
the state median repayment level. If debtor’s income is less than the state median, repayment 
could last for 3 years, if it is more, than generally for 5 years. (US Courts; Eraslan et al., 
2014)
Regarding  eligibility for  Chapter  7,  the  debtor  may be  an  individual,  a  partnership,  or  a 
corporation  or  other  business  entity  (US  Courts)  with  many  limitations  to  individuals. 
However, after filing for Chapter 7, a discharge is only available to individual debtors, not to 
partnerships or corporations. The right to a discharge is not absolute, some types of debts are 
3 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
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not discharged. Moreover, a bankruptcy discharge does not relieve the lien on the property. 
Regarding Chapter 13, any individual, a self-employed, a person operating an unincorporated 
business, sole proprietorships are eligible for relief, if the unsecured debts do not exceed a 
given threshold of debt (currently about TUSD 400 unsecured debt and MUSD 1,2 secured 
debt). A corporation or partnership is not eligible for filing for Chapter 13. (US Courts)
Studies focusing on the functioning of the US bankruptcy model have discovered that there 
are many severe differences and disparities across states between the formal laws and the 
implementation  of  the  laws in  action.  These  differences  are  apparent  despite  the  uniform 
federal legal regulation and mainly due to different legal cultures, attitudes, and practices of 
the government officials and other decisionmakers. (Efrat, 2003) Considering the appearance 
of fresh start,  one major element of the discrepancy is the exemption level applied by the 
legislation. That could vary among the states and offers one of the most important bases for 
studies  examining  the  effect  of  exemption  level  and  the  fresh  start  on  the  society  and 
economy.
The Austrian model
The Austrian model, launched in 1995, is a prototype for the continental legislative solution 
of  handling  personal  bankruptcies  in  Europe until  its  reform of 2017. First,  I  present  the 
original form of the system, then I focus on the main pillar of the reform, which substantially 
softened the strict construction of the procedure.
The system involves different options on how and where the procedure could continue based 
on the decision of  the debtor,  creditors,  or  the court/administration.  In  all  procedures  for 
starting  any  proceeding,  a  "good  faith"  is  required,  which  is  a  recurring  element  of  all 
personal bankruptcy procedures.  
There is no option for straight bankruptcy. The starting point of the proceeding is arranged 
“out of the court”, that existed before the law was created in 1995 and it is like the German 
legislative solution. It is an  amicable settlement, basically a restructuring of the obligation 
based on an agreement  between the creditors  and the debtor.  A repayment plan could be 
settled with a maximum length of 7 years, with a majority decision of the creditors, and in the 
case of successful completion of the plan with a discharge at the end. In this case, the debtor 
maintains its sovereignty in the management of his/her wealth, incomes, and costs to fulfill 
the agreed repayment plan, however official debt advisors are helping the process. (Győri, 
2009; Hetes-Gavra et al., 2016)
If amicable settlement fails, there are different ways to follow the proceeding on the court. To 
apply for a judicial  procedure the debtor  must prove that  the default  occurred,  its  wealth 
covers  the  cost  of  the  proceedings,  and the amicable  settlement  failed.  The possible  first 
process  is  a  “forced  composition”  (“Zwangsausgleich”).  The  debtor  must  offer  to  the 
creditors, that it pays back 20% in 2 years or 30% in 5 years of its obligation based on a 
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recovery plan. For approval a majority vote is needed, different thresholds are defined. In this 
case, there is no asset sale. (Győri, 2009; Hetes-Gavra et al., 2016; Wagner, 2006)
If the attempt for forced composition fails, the next possible proceeding is the repayment plan 
“Zahlungsplan”). In this case, the wealth, the assets of the debtor are registered, and sale is 
possible except for those, which are regarded as basics. Furthermore, a repayment plan of a 
maximum of 7 years must be prepared (no minimum recovery ratio is defined) and must be 
approved by majority voting of the creditors. During the accomplishment, the debtor still acts 
without  the  supervision  of  the  creditor  and  receives  a  full  discharge  at  the  end  of  the 
successful completion of the plan.
If the repayment plan is rejected, then the final possible process is the  absorption process 
(“Abschöpfungsverfahren”).  A  minimum  income  is  determined  by  the  court.  Above  this 
threshold,  all  payments  are  assigned  to  the  officially  appointed  trustee  and  are  directly 
transferred  to  the  creditors.  The  process  is  under  the  supervision  of  the  trustee  and  the 
creditors, the debtor must live on a minimum level. The length of the process is 3-7 years, and 
success and final discharge depend on the fact, how many percents of the obligation was paid 
back. In the case of 3 years, 50% of obligations (from sales and incomes) must be recovered. 
If the repayment within 7 years does not reach the 10% of unsecured obligation, there is no 
automatic discharge. It could take in force only based on a possible court decision based on 
inequity, however, the court could also lengthen the repayment period. (Győri, 2009; Hetes-
Gavra et al., 2016) In this type of procedure, there is no need for the approval of the creditors, 
however, it is strictly controlled by the regulation and there are strict eligibility requirements 
for  the  filers  (track  record  of  another  filing  in  the  past,  non-abusive,  fair,  responsible 
behavior). (Wagner, 2006)
Since the implementation of the first model, there had been several critics about the system 
due to its strict limitations and hurdles of a successful outcome. After decades of disputes, 
finally, a fundamental reform was implemented at the end of 2017. Several classic hurdles 
against fresh start – that are typical for European systems – were scrapped in the new model. 
The former circumstances concluded that low-income default filers have limited access to a 
procedure and had a low chance to gain a discharge at the end. The reform allowed that low-
income filers  can  immediately  proceed to  the  absorption  process.  The requirement  in  the 
absorption process was eased considerably, the minimum of 10% recovery was erased, the 
original 7-year long repayment period was shortened to 5 years. Besides these softer rules, 
allowances in the administrative cost were also introduced. (Kilborn, 2018) These measures 
were taken to move the legislation to a more lenient system and increase the number of filers. 
 The Hungarian model
Legislative solution for handling the personal default existed in Hungary before World War II 
but was erases in the socialist regime. The idea of implementing a new legislative framework 
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appeared during the financial crisis of 2009 when the non-performing retail loan portfolio had 
increased dramatically. Furthermore, many neighboring countries in the region had already 
implemented personal bankruptcy legislation. (OH, 2016) The current Hungarian model was 
launched in 2015, its  basic  principles,  objectives  correspond to the continental  models  of 
Germany, Austria,  Ireland, Spain.  One of the most highlighted aspects of the model is to 
consider  the interest  of the creditors  more,  which is  also typical  for European legislation 
examples. 
The usual principles for basic  eligibility criteria are the amicable behavior, cooperativeness 
with the authority, and the creditors, and respect all laws and regulations. Objective eligibility 
requirements are strict and precisely regulated based on the types, structure of debts, and the 
volume of obligations.  Obligations must come from products of personal loans, consumer 
loans,  or the obligation of private entrepreneurship.  Restrictive criteria,  which must be all 
fulfilled, are e.g. the minimum and maximum amount of overdue debt4 (HUF 2-20 million); 
its  ratio  to  the  wealth  of  the  debtor  (not  more  than  200%);  structure  (with  an  overdue 
obligation of a minimum of HUF 0,5 million, not more than five subordinated obligations). 
There  is  a  list  of  disqualifying  conditions  mainly  related  to  the presence of  other  similar 
procedures ongoing or in the past (criminal, legal procedures against the debtors, etc.). 
There are three possible procedures (in due course) defined and available. Like the Austrian 
model, the first possible step is (1) an amicable settlement, the restructuring of the obligation 
based on an agreement among the debtor and creditors without juridical, court intervention. 
Court  procedure  could  start  only  if  the  amicable  procedure  fails  due  to  the  failure  of 
agreements, or because there is no major creditor. The practice of encouraging the amicable 
agreement  is  common  in  Europe  (like  in  the  UK,  Germany,  France,  Austria).  It  is 
implemented as a procedure either outside the governmental institutional system or involved. 
(Báger, 2015; MNB, 2015)
The process must be initiated by the debtors by informing the major creditor (practicable the 
mortgage lender pledging the real estate). A special authority helps to accomplish a study 
about the incomes and wealth status of the debtor. The major creditor must accept the role of 
a coordinator for the agreement among the debtor and other creditors. The possible agreement 
is registered by the special authority. Though the control on the debtor is less strict, no trustee 
is  appointed  to  control  the  everyday  payments  and  incomes,  and  the  real  estate  is  not 
necessarily sold, there are strict requirements for the agreed repayments. Debtors are obliged 
to involve all their wealth and (future) incomes into the settlement procedure. Only a basic 
level of income could be spent on everyday living, no new obligation can be taken. Besides 
administrative fees, taxes, insurances, utility costs must be regularly paid, and a precisely 
defined minimum monthly debt service payment of the outstanding debts (initial market value 
of the real estate  × (7,8%/12=0,65%) ) must be met. In the case of successful fulfillment of 
the agreement, the debtor is discharged from the obligations at the end.
4 In the UK the debt is not required to be overdue. (Győri, 2009)
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The second step after the failure of amicable settlement is the (2) judicial procedure. Its first 
phase is the (2a) debt settlement procedure (“adósságrendezési eljárás”), which is managed by 
the trustee and the possible agreement is valid for all creditors participated in the procedure. It 
is finally (but not necessarily) approved by the court. The agreement includes all conditions, 
regulations of the repayments, possible sale-plan of pledged properties, the planned usage of 
incomes, maturities, controls, and possible restructuring, allowances. 
During the accomplishment of the agreement,  the life,  incomes,  spending of the debtor is 
highly controlled by the trustee mandated by the authority, having full control over the bank 
account, on incoming revenues and spending. A threshold for basic needs and spending is 
calculated  (per  person),  and  banking  and  cash  transactions  are  approved  based  on  these 
volumes. Real estate is not necessarily sold, it could be held or exchanged into a lower value 
real  estate.  All  unexpected  income,  a  new property  must  also  be  reported  and  turned  to 
repayment. Any extraordinary payment must be approved by the trustee. Those creditors who 
did  not  join  the  agreement  are  not  allowed to execute  any collection  activity  against  the 
debtor. There is a list of exemption of incomes and properties which represent and cover the 
basic needs of debtors and their families. Until the debt settlement procedure is accepted by 
the court, the minimum repayment obligation corresponds to the amount defined in amicable 
settlement (initial  market value of the real estate  ×(7,8%/12=0,65%)). Additional  payment 
obligations,  insurances,  fees,  taxes  must  also  be  paid.  In  exchange,  the  debtor  receives 
bankruptcy  protection  against  collection  measures.  If  the  debtors  severely  violate  their 
obligation  (act  in  bad faith,  malicious  acts,  etc.)  the procedure is  invalidated,  and former 
collection procedures could be continued. 
If no agreement is achieved in the debt settlement procedure, then a new procedure starts 
within  the  debt  settlement  procedure,  the  so-called  (2b)  debt repayment  procedure 
(“adósságtörlesztési eljárás”). Based on the proposal of the trustee, after a negotiation with the 
debtors and creditors, a repayment plan (“adósságtörlesztési terv”) is elaborated and approved 
by the court. Repayment plan details the grouping and splitting of revenues and properties, it 
defines the exempted level of incomes, the properties for sale, the rules of sharing the incomes 
among creditors,  the minimum incomes  that  could be used by the  debtor,  the repayment 
structure, all important tasks, and obligations. The repayment plan lasts typically for 5 years 
but could be lengthened by 2 years in case of approval of creditors. Houses, real estates could 
be held if "legitim reasons" exist, like creditors are not in active age, there are children (or 
family members over 70 years) in the family, or obligations do not reach the initial market 
value of the real estate. In the case of a sale, there is a possibility to buy a smaller home of a 
legitimate size, again, subject to the approval of the creditors.
Besides the cooperative, fair behavior of the creditors, the basic condition of the discharge is 
the  fulfillment  of  minimum  recovery  of  the  creditors  grouped  in  a  different  hierarchy 
(mortgage,  privileged,  other,  subordinated).  Major  creditors  are  practically  the  mortgage 
lenders  backed  by  pledged  assets,  collaterals.  Recovery  is  regarded  as  successful  if  the 
recovery during the repayment period reaches the initial market value (calculation is regulated 
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by the law) of the property, real estate. Before paying the mortgage obligation, taxes, fees, 
costs  of  the  former,  and  current  collection,  sale  procedures  must  be  also  paid.  Other 
obligations  must  be  recovered  at  a  level  of  38%,  subordinated  obligations  at  5%,  and 
privileged  obligations  at  a  level  of  120%  of  the  recovery  from  other  obligations.  By 
calculation, the volume of penalty fees, default interest rates must not be included.
The  excepted  income  for  ensuring  a  basic  level  of  living  is  also  strictly  regulated.  It 
corresponds to the minimum level of pension per person.5 In some special  cases, it  could 
reach its double. Besides the cost of living, utility costs, insurance cost, maintenance-related 
certified regular expenses could be also exempted from sources of repayment. 
It must be reported immediately if there is a change in the income status of the creditor (more 
than 10%),  there is  an extraordinary  income,  or  there is  any new property received.  The 
mandated trustee can check and supervise the creditor at any time. Creditors must report semi-
annually  about  the execution  of  the repayment  plan,  asset  sale,  repayment  status,  and all 
relevant aspects and events.
As the repayment plan must be approved by the court, the court will decide also on the final 
discharge at the end, whether the repayment plan was accomplished. In the case of success, all 
obligations that were not included in the repayment plan are discharged. For the obligation of 
creditors who did not join the debt, the settlement procedure is not forfeited, collections are 
not allowed to be executed during the procedure.
In summary, the Hungarian system is close to the former Austrian system and reflects the 
usual strict elements of the European systems and structures. The basic lines of the process 
are identical. After filing for the procedure, the legislation prefers agreements out of the court, 
if it fails, then on the court. Even without a mutual agreement, the could be a repayment plan 
by court decision at the end.
Subjective  eligibility  criteria  are  similar  to  all  structures:  fairness,  cooperativeness,  no 
fraudulent behavior. On the other hand, the objective eligibility criteria are very detailed and 
restrictive. Studies (Báger, 2015; MNB, 2015) show that the forecasted ratio for eligibility in 
the introduction year of 2015 was about 10-14% (15-20 000 potential files) of the total NPL 
(mortgage loan) portfolio. Final numbers are a fraction of the forecasted (about 3300 files). 
Exemption structures, the maturity of the repayment plan, discharge conditions are in line 
with the mainstream of European solutions.  The range of necessary repayment period for 
discharge is between 1-8 years, the applied 5 year-long period is like in several countries in 
the  region  (Poland,  Czech  Rep.).  (Báger,  2015)  The  minimum  repayment  obligation  for 
accomplishment (and also the possibility of a property sale or hold) is linked to the initial 
value of the real estate for the most important creditor segment of mortgage lenders. In other 
countries, it is defined as a percentage of the obligations. Knowing the high loan-to-value 
ratios of the former and later defaulted loans, especially the foreign currency loans, it seems 
that many loan obligation (even with the regulated interest rate) exceeds the former value of 
the real estate. This automatically would lead to an asset sale. It seems to result in a stricter 
5 In 2019 it is 28.500 forint/person.
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discharge  condition  relative  to  e.g.  the  Austrian  thresholds  of  10-20-50%.  However,  the 
differences should be examined more in detail with further empirical research.  
Finally, we must note, that the whole structure of the procedure, conditions, requirements are 
extremely complex. The dense content of leaflets, the long information materials, articles, the 
controversial or not clearly defined statements, some mistakes in formulation perfectly mirror 
the complexity  of the whole procedure.  Understanding all  details  and outcomes is  also a 
challenge for professionals in finance.
Conclusions
Bankruptcy systems vary among countries. The main characteristics of the systems could be 
outlined based on some central  criteria.  One key aspect is creditor/debtor friendliness, the 
opportunity to gain a “fresh start”. The existence and the conditions of the fresh start could be 
tracked based on some key elements of the systems. The opportunity for a fresh start could be 
described by many dimensions: access to the straight bankruptcy process, legibility criteria, 
expensiveness, degree of complexity, the structure of exemptions, debt settlement conditions, 
and the harshness of stigma. The degree of strictness of these dimensions determines the level 
of the “leniency” of a legislative solution.
The US solution differs from typical European systems. The US solution with the opportunity 
of straight bankruptcy is regarded as one of the most lenient systems, however, in 2005 the 
reforms had made it less debtor-friendly. On the other hand, European systems are typically 
less lenient. Interestingly – contrary to the US reform – some of these systems have shifted to 
the more lenient structures during the last decade, and several debtor-friendly changes were 
made in some European countries. 
The  Hungarian  system corresponds  to  the  former  Austrian  system and  reflects  the  usual 
elements of the European system and structures. It could be concluded that the Hungarian 
personal  bankruptcy  legislation  belongs  to  the  strict,  less  lenient  group  of  European 
regulations in its main elements (e.g. no straight bankruptcy complexity, strict eligibility, long 
restructuring  period,  strict  exemption  rules).  Interesting  to  note  that  the  system had been 
launched with its strict conditions for a fresh start just some years before Austria and other 
countries (like Slovakia) introduced more-lenient-type reforms due to internal critiques. 
There are several further research scopes to continue. One important research question would 
be to measure the degree of fresh start opportunity and leniency of the systems in specific 
countries. It could be also measured how changes affected the degree of leniency due to the 
different  reforms taken.  If  changes  are  measured,  then  the effect  of  changes  in  the  labor 
supply or entrepreneurship could be also better analyzed and understood.
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